









center" of Borges's story. Like previously explained, The Aleph is unexplainable in human language and highlights the insufficiencies for language to express truth.

Shlomey Mualem looks at the biblical depictions of The Aleph and the implications it has for the relationship between the divine and human language. Mualem notes the "internal split" within language: the human dimension, and the transcendental one, which cannot be expressed. Mualem notes the commentary made by Hasidic rabbi, Menahem Mendel Merimanov about God giving Moses the Ten Commandments. Merimanov believed that "all the divine voice pronounced was the first letter of the first word of the first command (in Hebrew: 'anochi') – the infinite Aleph. The rest was Moses' human interpretation" (Mualem 41). Mualem explains that this view suggests that The Aleph is the original language, one that captures all truth and a "spiritual resource of all the letters." Mualem continues to explain that "The cabalistic Aleph does not convey any concrete meaning since it comprises infinity. Thus it cannot be pronounced by humans and its utterance was the real divine revelation on Mount Sinai" (Mualem 41). The Aleph can be mentioned, but not expressed. Through a biblical lens, Mualem analyzes how the disconnect between a divine language, and a language humans can produce and perceive limit the ability for language to express truth in full.

It has been suggested here that language is insufficient in expressing truth. As Rorty, rephrasing the German Romantics, said that truth is not discovered, it is created (Rorty 1); reality is out there, we don't discover it, but our descriptions of it are nothing but creations of our language. What to do then? Rorty suggests that to be able to define oneself, one must "walk the length" of one's mind. By this, he means, play through each memory, from birth to the present day. (Rorty 23) In doing so, one spends the amount of time already doubled, as half of it is spent walking the length of the mind. If one tries to explain one's *self*, supposing one has access to an

Aleph in which they could see the entire length of their mind, at once, if we wish to tell someone else, or, again, think about it, the language they would use would be chronologic. Yet, chances are, as suggested in another story by Borges, "The Circular Ruins," that "[w]ith relief, with humiliation, with terror [we] realized that [we] too, was but appearance, that another man was dreaming him." (Borges 100) Rorty proposes: "[w]e shall see the conscious need of the strong poet to *demonstrate* that [we are] not a copy or replica as merely a special

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